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SELF-FULFILLING EXPECTATIONS, SPECULATIVE ATTACKS
ANDCAPITALCONTROLS
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the endogenous implementation of capital controls in
the context of a fixed exchange rate regime. It is shown that if there
exists a non-zero probability that the policymaker's response to a
speculative attack on official foreign reserves will be the introduction of
controls, such an attack may occur even when current and expected monetary
policy is consistent with a permanently viable, control-free fixed exchange
rate regime. Consequently, capital controls may be the outcome of self-
fulfilling expectations rather than the result of imprudent economic
policies.
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The last few years have witnessed a revival of interest in the
removal of economic restrictions that are so extensively being used in
most developing countries. The presence of such controls Is considered
to be one of the main obstacles to achieving sustained economic growth.
A voluminous literature on economic liberalization now exists which
deals with a wide variety of issues, like the optimal order of liberal-
ization of the foreign accounts, its relation to domestic stabilization
policies, etc. (for a survey of some of these issues as well as refer-
ences, see Edwards, 1983). However, despite widespread agreement on the
merits of economic liberalization, few such attempts have so far been
undertaken.Moreover, most of these attempts failed at one stage or
another, which led to the complete abandonment of economic reform.
The reason for the failure of liberalization experiments can be
traced either to the adoption of economic policies which proved incon-
sistent with the permanent removal of controls; or to the lack of
credibility of government policy.In the first case it is the current
behaviour of the policymakers that undermines the viability of the
reform. In the latter case, reform failure is the result of the
("destabilizing') behaviour of the public which acts on expectations of
future policy reversals (even when current policies seem prudent).
Inthispaper we deal with the second source of failure in the
contextof the choice of the exchange rate system. We analyze how the
choice of theexchangerate regime influences the probability of
successof a balance-of-payments liberalization attempt. We argue that
if current economic (monetary) policy is identical across alternative
exchange systems, a fixed regime is more likely to lead to a reimposi-2
tion of controls even when monetary authorities behave responsibly;
that is even when monetary policy is consistent1 with the permanent
maintenance of a control-free environment. What lies behind this
result is the fact that, in general, pegged and flexible exchange rates
are expected to be associated with different future economic policies.2
Pegged exchange rate systems are subject to possible balance-of-payments
crises that involve endogenous speculation against a currency and
associated capital flows.If people expect that, as a result of a
speculative run, governments will impose capital controls to maintain
the fixed regime, self-fulfilling expectations may cause such an attack
to take place and the subsequent failure of the liberalization experi-
ment. Note that the behaviour of individuals is absolutely rational as
their expectations are validated by subsequent policy actions.
We also argue that if a third party (like the IMF) stood willing
to lend foreign reserves to the domestic policymaker at a fixed rate in
the case of a speculative run, on the condition that "responsible"
monetary policy is maintained, no runs occur and a fixed exchange rate
regime without capital controls is viable (and no actual loans are
made).
Our analysis is applicable not only to the choice of the exchange
rate regime during a liberalization attempt but also to other policy
situations.For instance, it can explain why the effects of policy
threats may be diametrically opposite from their intended objectives.
As demonstrated in the paper, the threat of capital controls ignites
speculative attacks instead of serving to deter them.A similar
analysis can be applied to issues such as the effects of a variable
investment tax credit on investment and output fluctuations.3
THE MODEL
We employ a variant of the standard balance-of-payments- -crisis
model (see Flood and Carber, 1984, Obstfeld, 1986) to analyze the case
of a small open economy. During a liberalization experiment, domestic
residents can hold domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign money and
foreign bonds.Foreign money is not held because its return is dorni-
nated by the return on bonds. Domestic money pays no interest but it
is held because of the existence of trading frictions (such as a cash-
in-advance constraint). If capital control-s are imposed, domestic
residents can no longer legally transact in foreign assets. Under a
fixed regime, the domestic government has a stock of foreign reserves
that is used to support the fixed exchange rate.
The following assumptions describe the behaviour of policy:
(a) Actual and expected domestic monetary policy is the same across
different exchange rate regimes; it does not change following the
occurrence of a speculative run;3 and is such that if a speculative
attack did not cause the introduction of capital controls, the
fixed regime could be viable indefinitely.Hence, only runs
induced by the expectation of future controls can cause the
collapse of the fixed regime.
(b) If official reserves are brought below a certain critical value by
a speculative attack then the government imposes capital controls
(to be described shortly)
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where M. M. Dt, Rt, S, Pt and iarethe domestic nominal demand for
money, supply of money, domestic credit, foreign reserve holdings,
exchange rate, price level and nominal interest rate respectively; an
asterisk indicates "foreign"; and E is the expectations operator (we
assume rational expectations).To simplify the exposition, we set
P —1and i* —0.
We will assume that there are two critical values of Rt, R and R.
As long as official reserves exceed R, there are no restrictions on
transactions involving foreign issets.If, however, Rt slips below R,
a tax is imposed on purchases of foreign issets by domestic residents.
When the level of reserves hits R, then the government withdraws from
the foreign exchange market and lets the exchange rate float. One can
justify this specification by arguing that the domestic government
faces a perfectly elastic foreign supply of reserves up to R, an upward
sloping curve from R toand a perfectly inelastic one from R and on.
The fixed exchange rate is subject to capital controls in the interval
(R, R).An alternative specification could have been to have assumed
that once reserves reach R, the government imposes strict quantitative
capital controls that prohibit domestic residents from acquiring new
foreign assets; the demand for foreign assets is then satisfied in the
black market at a price that includes a premium.5
To ensure that capital controls are not the outcome of excessive
monetary expansion, but rather the result of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions about controls we will restrict the permissible behaviour of
domestic credit.We will require that, if the policymaker announced
that no capital controls would ever be imposed, monetary policy is such
that no run ever takes place and foreign reserves suffice to maintain
the fixed regime indefinitely. The required restriction Rt >Rimplies
that Utissuch that
Prob (Ut< aS-D-R)—1 (7)
where S is the fixed exchange rate.
To highlight the interaction between self-fulfilling expectations
and future possible policies we will consider two alternative policy
scenarios.Under the first, the government announces that she will
abandon the fixed regime when a balance-of-payments crisis occurs
(reserves decline below R) and will let the exchange rate float freely.
It is easy to show4 that under this policy, a speculative attack will
lead to an exchange rateappreciation. Consequently, people who
participatein the attack- -and exchange domestic for foreign assets- -
willexperience a capital loss. As participation in anattackviolates
individualrationality, no run takes place.
Under the second option, the domestic government threatens (credi-
bly) that she will impose a tax, r. on acquisition of foreign assets if
a run against the domestic currency causes foreign reserves to sink
below R.We will now demonstrate that the existence of this threat
makes a speculative run a non-zero probability event, and that the
likelihood of a run depends on the interest elasticity of the demand6
for money and the probability distribution of the shock to domestic
credit (Ut). What makes an attack possible is the fact that while the
domestic credit shock is not sufficient to wipe reserves out on its own
(condition 7), a substantial drop in foreign reserves becomes possible
when one includes the effect of the change in the domestic nominal
interest rate on the demand for money.The interest rate changes
because the threat of capital controls leads to an expected (implicit)
currency devaluation which requires that the nominal interest rate rise
tocompensate holders of domestic currency denomninates assets for
potential capital losses.
Theexpected exchange rate for period t+l as of period t is
—q(l+r)S+ (l-q)S —(l+qr)S> S. (8)
t
where q is the probability that Ut exceeds some critical level u, and u
is determined by
—(a-b.i)S-D-R (9)
(8) says that the expected exchange rate is the weighted sum of the
fixed exchange rate that will prevail if no run takes place and the
fixed cuin tax rate if a run takes place.In (9) any Ut > u causes an
excess supply of money which cannot be satisfied with an outflow of
reserves (given R) but requires an exchange rate depreciation. Hence
for any u > u a speculative attack occurs and capital controls are
imposed.
(8) and (6) imply that i —qrand substituting into (9) we have
that q satisfies the condition
q —prob(Ut > u) —prob[Ut > (a-bqr)S -D-RI (10)7
Wecan think of q as the probability of a balance-of-payments
crisis. Since ut is an i.i.d. random variable and thenominalinterest
rate is a constant, theprobabilityof an attack is the same for all
time periods.5 Capital controls are imposed the first time Utexceeds
u. Notice that if the interest elasticity of the demand for money were
zero, expression (10) would reduce to (7) with q —0,that is no attack
would ever occur.
Up to this point we have assumed that controls are known to be
imposed with certainty when reserves slip below R. Our analysis,
however, can be extended to deal with situations inwhichthe policy-
maker's response to a speculative attack is uncertain.For instance,
suppose that the public believes that, following a run, controls will




where q is the probability that Utexceedsa new6 critical level U.If
ES+i <Sno attackever takes place. If, however, the exchange rate
is expected todepreciatefollowing arun (ESi>S),arun may take
placeiftherealization of Utissufficientlyhigh. The probability
of an attack is lower now and it depends on the probability distribution
of the domestic credit shock (q), the probability the public attacks to
governmentintentions to impose capital controls (y) ,theinterest
elasticityof the demand for money and on the level of reserves,
domestic credit and the exchange rate.Note thatif thepolicymaker8
could credibly choose the probability of imposing controls (which
depends on things like the- -publicly perceived- -importanceshe attaches
to a fixed regime relative to a flexible), the optimal choice involves
setting y —0.If, however, announcements of future policies are not
credible, and no precoininitment technology is available, then the public
will assess the value of y by evaluating the policyinaker's objective
function under the two policy options.The higher y, the higher the
possibility that a run will take place.
Before concluding this paper it is worthwhile making one remark
that seems to have relevance for real world liberalization reforms. If
an outside party (like the IMF) credibly promises to provide loans at a
fixed rate, conditioned on the doumestic policymnaker's following respon-
sible monetary policies (which the policymnaker does in our model
because of condition 7), then the fixed regime could be maintained
indefinitely with no attacks and capital controls.In such a case the
choiceof the exchange rate regime is of no consequence for the proba-
bility of success of an economic liberalization attelmmpt.Moreover, in
equilibrium,no actual loans need to be mimade.Whether such an IMF
policy would be welfare-improving, or even feasible, is a more difficult
issue that we do not address here.Notes
1Proponentsof a fixed exchange system believe that a fixed regime
imposes discipline on the behaviour of monetary authorities (by endoge-
nizing the money supply)In our case we assume that policymakers are
already disciplined, and that the choice of exchange systems does not
matter for the domestic credit component of the money supply.
2Stockman (1988) has emphasized the importance of these issues in
the context of the behaviour of relative prices across exchange rate
systems.
31f it did, it could fuel crisis expectations as it does in
Obstfeld (1986).
41f, as a result of a speculative attack, the government switches
to a floating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate will be determined
by the following stochastic diffurence equations (which is derived by
combining equations (1), (2), (5) and (6)):
bES1 +(a+h)S—R+Dt (Al)
t
whichcan be solved for St and whencombinedwith equation (4) gives
S —a1(R+D)+(a+b)1ut (A2)
(A2) and condition (8) imply that St <S,i.e., the exchange rate
appreciates.
51t could vary over time if Ut was an autocorrelated stochastic
process.
6u is defined in a way similar to u in (9). The only difference
is that the nominal interest rate will now be calculated using (11)10
rather than (8).Notice that q q, so a run is iiiore likely to occur
when controls are expected to be imposed withceLtainty.Re ferences
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